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EDITORIAL
SPECIAL GRAND JURIES IN ILLINOIS
For several months a Special Grand Jury has been in session in
Cook County, Illinois, largely devoting its time to an investigation of
the Chicago Police Department. It is a Grand Jury impaneled as such
and not a regular Grand Jury continued beyond a court term. Some
question has been raised as to its legality. However, an examination
of the law appears to sustain the soundness of the position that a
Special Grand Jury in Illinois may continue indefinitely and is not
restricted by the rule applicable to regular Grand Juries.
No definition of the grand jury is found in either the Illinois
Constitution of 1.818 or the Illinois Constitution of 1870. No act of the
legislature has ever attempted to define the grand jury. The grand
jury had its origin in the common law and has existed for many
hundred years. Its constitution, organization and method of proceeding
were all well known features of the common law before the organiza-
tion of the State of Illinois and have been recognized and adopted'
in all our constitutions and in legislation as it existed at the organiza-
tion of the state. One of the earliest acts of the first legislature of the
state was the act of February 4, 1819 (Laws of 1819, p. 3) which
declared that the common law of England, all statutes or acts of the
British Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth
year of King James I, excepting the second section of the sixth
chapter of 43 Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 43 Elizabeth and the
ninth chapter of 37 Henry VIII, and which are of a general nature
and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision and shall
be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.
The conclusion follows that the state from its origin has provided
for the prosecution of violations of the criminal law by means of
indictment by a grand jury, and that the grand jury is that which
existed in the common law of England prior to the fourth year of
King James I, which began on March 24, 1606. No other grand jury
was known to the law. No definition of it was attempted but it was
referred to as an institution which needed no definition. When it was
so referred to, the common law grand jury became a part of the
fundamental law of the state for the prosecution of crime, and no
authority has ever existed in this state for the prosecution of felonies
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except upon the indictment of a grand jury. (People vs. Graydon 333,
Ill. 429).
As at common law, the grand jury is endowed with inquisitorial
powers in addition to its duty and power of hearing testimony and
viewing evidence preliminary to the return of indictments and no bills.
Its investigations are limited to matters
(a) to which its attention is called by the court,
(b) which are submitted to its consideration by the prosecuting officer,
(c) which come to its knqwledge in the course of its investigations
into matters brought before it, or from its own observations,
(d) which come to its knowledge from disclosures made by its
members.
Just as it is not necessary that an examination of the accused by a
committing magistrate shall precede the investigations of the grand
jury, so it is not necessary that such investigations should be preceded
by the submission of a formal charge to the grand jury. Consequently,
a grand jury may properly act on the personal knowledge of any of
its members communicated to his fellows under no other sanction than
the grand juror's oath. Indeed, the oath administered to the grand
jury clearly indicates the right of the jury to act on its own volition.
The oath, which is the commission under which the jury acts, assigns
no limits except those marked by diligence itself, to the course of its
inquiries.
The grand jury is not appointed for the prosecutor nor for the
court; it is appointed for the government and for the people; and both
the government and people are surely concerned, on the one hand, that
all crimes, whether given or not given in charge to the grand jury,
whether described or not deskribed with professional skill, should re-
ceive the punishment which the law denounces; and, on the other
hand, that innocence however strongly assailed by accusations drawn
up in regular form, and by accusers marshalled in legal array, should,
on full investigation, be securely protected.
(12 Ruling Case Law 1034).
To what extent is the grand jury enabled to fulfill efficiently and
successfully this important inquisitional function?
Where the pressure of routine duties is not great and the in-
vestigation undertaken is not involved and can be completed within
the term of service of the grand jury, no difficulty is encountered.
What is the solution, however, when the grand jury is compelled to
utilize practically all of its time in the performance of routine tasks
and the investigation attempted is replete with complications?
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During the first ten months of 1930, ten grand juries in Cook
County returned 3512 indictments or true bills and 1064 no bills. As-
suming that there were twenty-three working days in etch month and
that the grand jury was in session for five hours each day, it can
readily be seen that an average time of fifteen minutes was required
to dispose of each of the 4576 cases presented to the grand juries for
their consideration. A grand jury in Cook County is required to
consider and act upon approximately 457 cases each month, or about
twenty each day. It is evident from these facts that due to the pressure
of routine duties, a regular grand jury in Cook County cannot under-
take and complete even a superficial investigation within the term of
its service.
In seeking a solution to the problem of enabling the grand jury
to effectively perform its inquisitorial function, the following questions
arise:
1. Whether a regular grand jury can be continued from term to
term to enable it to complete an investigation begun by it.
2. Whether a regular and special grand jury can 'be impaneled dur-
ing the same term; the special grand jury conducting investigations and
the regular grand jury performing the routine tasks.
3. Whether a special grand jury can be continued from term to
term to enable it to complete an investigation begun by it.
In the case of People vs. Cochrane, 307 Ill. 126, the Illinois
Supreme Court was called upon to determine the legal significance of
acts committed by a grand jury during a term of court subsequent to
that in which it had been impaneled. The Supreme Court held that de-
spite the fact that the order continuing the grand jury from term to
term was erroneous, it was not without jurisdiction and the grand jury
was a grand jury de facto performing the functions of a grand jury de
jure as part of the court. The opinion stated, however, that although
the question of the legality of the grand jury could not be raised on
a writ of error, an accused person could raise the question through
a challenge to the array or a motion to quash the indictment on the
particular ground that the grand jury was illegally constituted.
Ten months after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
the above case, the opinion in the case of People vs. Brautigan (310
111. 472) appeared. The facts in the Cochrane case and the Brautigan
case were similar and concerned the same grand jury. However, the
iecord before the Supreme Court in the Brautigan case disclosed the
additional fact that a grand jury de jure was in existence at the time
the grand jury in question was being continued from term to term. The
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opinion of the Supreme Court in the Brautigan case reads in part
as follows:
"The grand jury at common law sat through the term unless its
duties were sooner completed, and its existence ceased with the term.
Two grand juries were summoned in the county of Middlesex and in
the County of Suffolk, while in Yorkshire one panel of forty-eight
freeholders and copyholders only could be returned to serve in the
assises, and at the sessions only forty could be returned on the panel.
(1 Chitty on Crim. Law, 157, 310, 311). These were special exceptions,
there being under the common law of England, except in these in-
stances, but one grand jury, consisting of not less than twelve or more
than twenty-three men. (1 Chitty on Crim. Law, 310.) Another
grand jury might be summoned on two occasions, the first when
before the end of the sessions the grand jury, having brought in its
bills, was discharged by the court and after its discharge 'either some
new offense was committed and the party taken and brought into
gaol, or when, after the discharge of the grand inquest, some offender
was taken and brought in before the conclusion of the sessions. The
other instance of a new grand jury being sworn was when it was to
inquire, under the statute (3 Henry VII, ch. 1) of the concealment
of a former inquest. This was anciently the proper mode of punish-
ing the grand jurors if they refused to present such things as were
within their charge of which they had sufficient evidence. This latter
case may be disregarded, for it fell into disuse many years ago, and
the practice which has been since followed, instead of impeaching the
grand jury who failed to find a true bill, was to present an indictment
to another grand jury. The common law power of the court to
call a special grand jury, since the practice of impeachment of the
grand jury has been abandoned, has been limited to cases of offenses
committed after the grand jury has been discharged or when some
offender has been arrested after the discharge of the grand jury.
"Our statute (Rev. Stat. chap. 78, sec. 19,) has provided a
method of summoning a special grand jury, as follows:
'The judge of any court of record of competent jurisdiction may
order a special venire to be issued for a grand jury at any time when
be shall be of opinion that public justice requires it. The order
for such venire shall be entered on the records of the court by the
clerk thereof; and such clerk shall forthwith issue such venire under
his hand and the seal of the court, and deliver the same to the
sheriff, who shall execute the same by summoning, in the same manner
now provided or that may hereafter be provided by law for summon-
SPECIAL GRAND JURIES 167
ing jurors, twenty-three persons qualified by law, to constitute a grand
jury. Such venire shall state the day on which such persons shall
appear before the court.' No attempt was made to comply with this
section and no claim of compliance is made by the Attorney General.
The people rely upon the fact that the record shows that the grand
jury of the August term, 1922, was never discharged but was con-
tinued from term to term because its work was not completed.
At common law the grand jury expired with the term, and no statute
has changed this rule or authorized any court to continue a grand jury
beyond the adjournment of the term. Therefore the grand jury's authority
ceased on the last day of the August term with the adjournment of the
court, and the order purporting to extend its powers was void."
The Supreme Court held further that the grand jury which was
continued could not become a grand jury de facto because there was
in each term to which it had been continued a grand jury de jure which
was performing the duties of that body.
It is important to note in the decision in the Brautigan case the
statement of the court to the effect that the common law power of
the court to call a special grand jury is limited to cases of offenses
committed after the grand jury has been discharged or when some
offender is arrested after the discharge of the grand jury. It is,
therefore, apparent that at common law there existed a definite
limitation upon the court's power to call a special grand jury. The
Suprene Court points out that the continued grand jury in the Brauti-
gan case was not a common law special grand-jury and that there
had been no attempt made to impanel it as statutory special grand
jury.
Finally, in the case of People vs. Graydon 333 Ill. 429, the
Supreme Court held that while the common law power of the court
to call a special grand jury was limited to cases of offenses committed
after the grand jury has been discharged or when some offender has
been arrested after the discharge of the grand jury, the common law
in this respect has been changed by statute authorizing a special
venire when in the opinion of the court public justice requires it, and,
a special grand jury impaneled on a venire issued in Cook County
while the regular grand jury was in session and performing its duties
was authorized to return an indictment giving the criminal court
jurisdiction to hold a prisoner for trial.
The decision reads in part as follows:
"It was not decided in the Brautigan case, supra, that the issuing of
a special venire for a grand jury and the impaneling of such grand
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jury while a grand jury regularly impaneled was in existence was un-
authorized by law. This is the question presented for decision in the
present case. While the statute of 1819 declared that the common law
of England and the statutes or acts of the British Parliament made in
aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of King James the First,
with the exceptions mentioned, and which were of a general nature and
not local to that kingdom, should be the rule of decision in this State, it
was further declared that they should be considered of full force only
until repealed by legislative authority. The legislature has full power
to repeal or modify the common law as thus declared except as restrained
by constitutional limitation. Our state (Rev. Stat. chap. 78, sec. 19), has
provided a method of summoning a special grand jury, as follows: 'The
judge of any court of record of competent jurisdiction may order a
special venire to be issued for a grand jury at any time when he shall
be of opinion that public justice requires it. The order for such venire
shall be entered on the records of the court by the clerk thereof; and
such clerk shall forthwith issue such venire under his hand and the seal
of the court, and deliver the same to the sheriff, who shall execute the
same by summoning, in the same manner now provided, or that may
hereafter be provided by law for summoning jurors, twenty-three persons,
qualified by law, to constitute a grand jury. Such venire shall state
the day on which such persons shall appear before the court.' There are
many statutory provisions that at certain specified terms of court in
particular counties no grand jury shall be summoned, or that no criminal
business shall be transacted, or that no grand jury shall be summoned
except by a special order of the judge holding the court. No restraint
has been imposed by the constitution upon the power of the legislature
to determine at what time, under what circumstances and in what manner
a grand jury may be summoned, but the matter is left entirely to the
discretion of the legislature.
The constitution has committed to the General Assembly the power
to provide for the times of holding court in each county, and the power
has been exercised by fixing the terms of court for the transaction of
criminal business, of civil business and of business which does not require
the presence of a jury, either grand or petit, and it has further provided
that the judge of any" court of record of competent jurisdiction may
order a special venire to be issued for a grand jury at any time when he
shall be of opinion that public justice requires it. The question is com-
mitted to the discretion of the judge of the court, and the legislative act
modifying the common law and authorizing the issuing of a special venire
for a grand jury at any time when in the opinion of the judge public
justice requires it violates no constitutional limitation. With the question
of the policy or wisdom of authorizing the impaneling of a special grand
jury when a grand jury regularly impaneled is performing the duties of
such body we have no concern. The act authorizes the issue of a special
venire for a grand jury at any time the judge shall be of opinion that
public justice requires it, and we have no right to impose any further
limitation on the exercise of the power."
SPECIAL GRAND JURIES
From the above decision it can be seen that the special grand jury
authorized by statute in Illinois was not known to the common law.
Unlike the common law special grand jury, the statutory special grand
jury may be impaneled at any time that public justice requires it,
whether a regular grand jury is in session or not. So, while the com-
mon law may have placed certain limitations upon the common law
special grand jury and the power of the court at common law to call
a special grand jury, these limitations have no application to the
special grand jury now authorized by statute in this state. At common
law a special grand jury could not be impaneled while the regular
grand jury was in session. The Supreme Court in the Graydon case
ruled that the legislative enactment authorizing a special grand jury
constituted a modification of the common law and that the statutory
special grand jury could be impaneled at any time that public justice
requires. At common law the existence of the special grand jury ceased
with the term. The act of the Illinois General Assembly modifying
the common law, places no limitations upon the term of the existence
of a special grand jury. It cannot, therefore, be reasonably main-
tained that the special grand jury authorized by statute is limited in
its existence to one term. The statutory special grand jury being
unknown to the common law cannot be measured by rules and limita-
tions placed upon special grand juries at common law.
A special grand jury may be called whenever public justice re-
quires and there is nothing in the law taking from the special grand
jury the right to continue its inquisitions. A study and analysis of the
Illinois statutes and the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court result
in the conclusion that:
1. A regular grand jury may be continued from the term in which
it is impaneled to the following term but its acts at such following term
are the acts of a grand jury de facto. A grand jury de facto cannot
effectively conduct an investigation for the reason that its acts may suc-
cessfully be objected to, either through a challenge to the array or
motion to quash the indictment on the particular ground that the grand
jury was not legally constituted.
2. A special grand jury may be impaneled to conduct investigations
although a regular grand jury was previously impaneled during the same
term.
3. A special grand jury may be continued, from term to term to
enable it to complete an investigation begun by it.
The legal conclusion that a special grand jury authorized by
statute in Illinois may continue in session until an inquisition begun
by it is completed violates no rule of statutory interpretation. It will
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be argued that when a statute which is evidently intended to make an
innovation upon the common law is susceptible of more than one
construction, it is not to be construed as altering the common law
further than the language of the statute clearly and necessarily re-
quires and that therefore the common law rule limiting the existence of
the special grand jury to the term in which it is impaneled has not
been abrogated by the statute. In answer to this it may be stated
that a statute will be deemed to abrogate the common law where its
provisions are inconsistent with and repugnant to the common law
and a survival of the common law would in effect deprive the statute
of its efficacy and render its provisions nugatory.
It can only be stated that the special grand jury at common law
was not an inquisitorial body and could be called only when the regular
grand jury was discharged before the end of the term and could
consider only arrests made and offenses committed after the dis-
charge of the regular grand jury. By virtue of the decision in the
Graydon case, the statutory special grand jury may be an inquisitorial
body and may be called at any time.
Let it be assumed that a great emergency arises and it becomes im-
perative that a special grand jury, authorized by statute, be impaneled
three days before the end of a court term in order to conduct a
very vital and important investigation which would require months to
complete. For three days the special grand jury is busily engaged in
hearing witnesses and examining evidence. Was it the intent of the
legislature that the inquisitorial special grand jury authorized, by it
and which was unknown to the common law be bound by the limita-
tions placed upon the special grand jury at common law to the extent
that, in the hypothetical case above, the court would be compelled to
discharge the special grand jury and impanel a new special grand
jury which would be required to start anew?
The answer, based upon the decisions and statutes, is that in this
state a special grand jury may continue its investigations from term
to term until it has completed its inquisitions and has been discharged
by the court.
HENRY BARRETT CHAMBERLIN.
